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Only eight years ago, Central Asian1 region was characterized as being “largely ignored as
a scholarly backwater of the defunct communist world system”.2
Since then the situation has changed; and the role of the Central Asian region in inter-
national affairs has increased considerably. Several developments within the region
ushered in new geopolitical approaches, echoing international rivalries for the dominance
in the ex-Soviet republics. Kazakhstan’s oil export and the Kyrgyz Manas military bases are
among those international disagreements that echoed in the “Great Game” vision of
Central Asia in the world literature.
Could geopolitics be the key approach to frame complex developments in the region? Or is
this the case when particular methodological “lenses”3 through which one could consider
the world are counter-productive?
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After the collapse of the USSR, Central Asian countries
that were not well known to the general international
community have increased their role on the interna-
tional economic and political landscape. There is
a Chinese proverb that it is a great happiness and
unhappiness simultaneously to be born when empires
collapse and are created. The collapse of the Soviet
regime opened new alternatives for the development in
the post-Soviet world. However, in addition, instead of
entering a new era of post-cold war stability and coop-
eration, the former Soviet countries of Ukraine, Georgia,
and Central Asia are more increasingly deﬁned as
transforming into regions of competition for the leading
world powers (Lukyanov, 2010). In a recent Swiss paper
with the engaging title of “Central Asia: Great Game or
Graveyard?”, for example, readers were asked, “Could it
be that the Great Game Rudyard Kipling described
a century ago in Central Asia is back?” (Feiertag, 2009).nyang University. Production and hosting by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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national conﬂicts, due to its unique geopolitical position
and substantial natural resources are becoming increas-
ingly common. However, the regional transformations
are accompanied by numerous problems that complicate
not only Central Asian foreign relations, but general
development processes. Kirghizia’s political and social
revolutions, Andigan and Fergana valley events, Uzbekh–
Kyrgyzh border tensions, Kozak–Kazakh tensions in the
northern territories of Kazakhstan during the ﬁrst years
of independence, potentially explosive investment
agreements on oil exploitation and export in Kazakhstan,
and the increased threat of drug-trafﬁcking and
terrorism spreading from Afghanistan are some of new
problems that appeared in post-Soviet Central Asia. The
2010 coup in Kyrgyzstan prompted concerns that such
revolutions could lead to increased international
confrontation between the global powers involved.
These concerns are due to the tension between Russian
and US military and economic interests, along with
broader factors, where geopolitics does play an inﬂuen-
tial and critical role. The Central Asian region is also of
immense interest to China, which has been trying to
increase its role in the region through the Shanghais
Cooperation Organization, and by increasing investments
in Central Asian countries. In fact, new concerns are now
being expressed that new international confrontations
will emerge which may involve China also; while at the
same time these powers have been trying to form alli-
ances so to enforce its power.4
In this paper, ﬁrstly, new geopolitical theoretical
frameworks will be examined, addressing new social,
political and economic challenges in the region.5 It will be
argued that two countries in the Central Asian region in
particular present the most vivid case studies related to the
rise of a new geopolitics: oil-abundant, currently stable
Kazakhstan versus explosive Kirghizia, one of the poorest
states in the CIS. These two cases are helpful in providing
insights into strategic transformations in the region, and
the geopolitical dimensions of the region’s development.
These two states nevertheless have much in common –
multilateral foreign policies, and strategically important
geopolitical locations; hence presenting the most vivid
cases in the recent regional geopolitical developments.
Particular emphasis will be placed on the case of
Kazakhstan, focusing in particular on the country’s rela-
tions with its foreign partners in both oil and security.
Consideration of these two cases requires examining some
existing trends in regionalism, and the role of regional
organizations versus international organizations in the
foreign relations of these countries. The number of prob-
lems and threats that the region is confrontedwith speak in4 Mearsheimer, J. (2010). “A Gathering Storm: China’s Challenge to US
Power in Asia”. Speech, University of Sydney, Australia, August 4.
5 International and national reports, content analysis of newspapers and
other periodical literature with regards to the recent coup in Kirgizia have
been analyzed for this paper. In addition, the data of the regional inte-
gration centers (such as SCO and CSTO), researched during my ﬁeld-trip,
and responses to my questions by the representatives of these organi-
zations are also incorporated into the paper.favor of the increased necessity of international coopera-
tion between the regional and international organizations.
This, in turn, demonstrates that purely geopolitical priori-
ties in the foreign policies of the world powers toward the
region and in the foreign policies of the regions’ countries
themselves are misleading and counter-productive in the
long-term perspective.2. Central Asian developments and the revival of
geopolitical studies
Post-Soviet transformations are inﬂuenced by a variety
of national and international factors. There are several
theoretical international relations frameworks that have
been used to analyze Central Asian developments: neo-
liberalism, neo-realism, constructivism, primordialism
and geopolitics. A neo-liberal approach to Central Asian
developments was especially popular during the initial
period, following the collapse of the USSR. However,
starting from 2000, increased political and economic
confrontations prompted scholars world-wide to refer to
neo-realism to understand the turbulent developments in
the region. In addition to these traditional schools,
constructivism – speciﬁcally deﬁning aspects of regional
integration,6 and primordialism – related to the formation
of national identity7 have been taking an increasingly
stronger niche in the post-Soviet theoretical debates.
New geopolitical studies, focusing on Central Asia, echo
concepts that originated before the establishment of the
USSR. The geopolitical approach was proposed by Sir
Halford Mackinder in his concept of Heartland. His Heart-
land Theory is apparently the most well known geopolitical
model, emphasizing the ascendancy of land-based power
over sea-based power. The pivotal area, or the Heartland,
was roughly deﬁned by Central Asia, fromwhere horsemen
dominated Asia and Europe (Mackinder, 1996, pp. 175–
194). On the eve of political transformations in the CIS,
Brzezinski, the former national security advisor to Presi-
dent Jimmy Carter, and the US scholar Huntington pre-
sented their theories of Eurasia, which was characterized as
a potentially dangerous geopolitical and ethnically
unstable region (Brzezinski, 1998, pp. 265-269;
Huntington, 1996). This agitated many scholars in the
former USSR. However, it soon became evident that
stability in the region had been seriously threatened by the
number of conﬂicts in the region, and the unstable political
and economic regimes in the independent countries.
Brzezinski and Huntington’s thesis made the US increas-
ingly wary of potential instability in the region. As
emphasized in the introduction, “because of its internal
problemsdwhich include great economic uncertainty
despite vast oil wealth, a disintegrating infrastructure, and
the potential for internal instabilitydand its geopolitical
position, Kazakhstan and the region of Central Asia present
a complex set of opportunities and dangers for the major6 For a sample of these studies, see Kubicek (1997); Luong (2009); Bohr
(2004); Tsantoulis (2009).
7 See, in particular, Dave (2007); Suny (2001); Shlapentokh (2002);
Zamiatin (2002).
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which fundamentally impacted upon the social and
economic well-being of the Central Asian population,
became a wide-spread notion used to explain the region’s
trends.8 From the perspective of US policy-making ofﬁcials,
for example, the Caspian region’s geo-strategic dimensions
for the United States have not been limited to energy
security issues; they have implications for the grand
strategy of the United States in the twenty-ﬁrst century:
“the US not only aims to politically control regional energy
resources, in particular Kazakh oil, but also checks potential
challengers to its grand strategy such as China and Russia”
(Iseri, 2009, pp. 26–46). In 2003, Michael Klare’s approach
to the US foreign policy interests in Central Asia was also of
an alarmist nature, when he stated “the beginning of a new
Cold War in south-central Eurasia, with many possibilities
for crises and ﬂare-ups, because nowhere else in the world
are Russia and China directly involved and supporting
groups and regimes that are opposed to the United States”
(Klare, 2003). In turn, several post-Soviet scholars also
emphasize geopolitics over other approaches in interna-
tional relations; Dugin’s publications (2004, 2007), priori-
tizing the geopolitical role and interests of Russia and
Kazakhstan are among these new works.
Among other developments of geopolitical approaches
applied to the Central Asian transformations, theories of
critical geopolitics could be distinguished. This research is
presented by such scholars as Agnew, Dalby, Dodds, and Ó
Tuathail. Critical geopolitics is aimed “at creating a synthesis
between orthodox geopolitics and geo-economic discourse
to develop a new understanding of geographic arrange-
ments as social constructions that are changeable over time”
(IIAS, 2002). According to this approach world politics is
represented by states embedded into transnational techno-
economic power structures. It is stressed by the supporters
of this approach that such structures threaten habitation
and survival on the planet as a whole (Amineh, 2002). The
Central Asian developments are, in particular, viewed from
this perspective,9 and offer a more complex account of the
transitions the region has been going through. It should also
be pointed out that in the academic literature there is a new
tendency to review not only the applicability of any partic-
ular approach, but also responsibilities to “launch such ships
in the world” (Megoran, 2004, p.735) – thinking strategi-
cally about consequences of the approaches presented
internationally. Some, such as Cox (1981, p. 87), believe that
“theory is always for someone and for some purpose”,
referring to the use of geopolitics in pursuing Western
interests. In fact, in many cases the broader interests of
regions in development (economically or democratically)
are not sufﬁciently considered by the Western powers10.8 See, for example, Malisheva (2009); Blank, S. (2001); Allison, R., and
Jonson, L. (2001). The United States and Central Asia, in Central Asian
Security: The New International Context. Washington, DC and London:
Brookings Institution and RIIA.
9 See, in particular, Megoran, N. (2004). The critical geopolitics of the
Uzbekistan–Kyrgyzstan Ferghana Valley boundary dispute, 1999–2000,
Political Geography, 6(23).
10 Examples of Kazakhstan’s oil politics and the situation over human
rights and social developments in Kyrgyzstan are further outlined.Others, like Hepple (1986, p.32), are against “dangerously
misleading geopolitical doctrines and policies”. In many
cases approaches, based only on geopolitical aspects, could
serve as propaganda for policy-makers (Kara-Mursa, 2000),
as opposed to providing efﬁcient and helpful clues to more
successful regional developments and international coop-
eration. This statement is applicable to Central Asia; devel-
opments therein are further reviewed in the article.3. Kazakhstan’s ‘multipolarity’, oil politics, and
security policy
Kazakhstan is a landlocked country between Russia,
China, Kirghizia, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan. Following
the collapse of the USSR, the advantageous geopolitical
location – between Europe and Asia in more broad terms –
and the country’s rich natural resources resulted in the
interests of the major global powers such as the USA,
Russia, China, Europe, and the Islamic world in strategic
cooperationwith the Republic. During the last two decades,
Kazakhstan’s multipolar foreign policy was chosen by
Kazakhstan’s government as a response to these vested
interests, and as a strategy to balance the national interests
among these global powers (Ipek, 2007). According to
Yertisbayev, ex advisor to the President of Kazakhstan,
“Kazakhstan’s multi-vector foreign policy is not just
a subjective will or “doctrine” of Nazarbayev, but, appar-
ently, the result of the geographical position of the young
independent state, [and the] appearance of a new geopo-
litical reality in the world politics d Central Asia”
(Yertisbayev, 2001).
The Republic has vast various natural resources,
including uranium and crude oil, the exploitation and
export of which has eventually resulted in the country’s
macro-economic growth. In 1992, Kazakhstan’s GDP was
equal to 20 billion USD; however, in 2008, due to the
country’s oil reserves, it reached 135 billion USD (CIA,
2010). Kazakhstan is the second largest oil producer
among the former Soviet republics after Russia (Ernst &
Young, 2011, p. 2); and by 2015, according to the Repub-
lic’s state strategies, the country will join the top 10 oil and
gas exporters. Kazakh oil export is growing rapidly, with
current infrastructure delivering it toworldmarkets via the
Black Sea (through Russia), the Persian Gulf, to the north
pipeline and rail (through Russia also), and recently to the
East – China (UNCTAD, 2010). Oil production and exploi-
tation have raised several international controversies,
involving Russia, the US, and several European trans-
national oil corporations (Babali, 2009). The investigation
of oil at the Kashagan ﬁeld has considerable role in these
controversies, as it is believed to be the largest oil discovery
in the last 35 years (US EAI, 2008).11 Kalicki, who served as
the Clinton administration’s Ombudsman for Energy and
Commercial Cooperationwith the New Independent States,
appealed in his work for Washington “to do whatever is11 It should be pointed out that these controversies between the countries
even include the estimates of the ﬁeld’s oil reserves – as US EAI estimates
are considerably higher than those of the Russian sources and some
international reports.
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pendent routes for Caspian energy to reach the outside
world” (Kalicki, 2001). American companies alone hold
more than a quarter of foreign direct investments in
Kazakhstan – approximately $11.8 billion from 1993
through to 2006 (National Bank of Kazakshtan, 2006). The
construction of oil pipelines and their direction is another
disputable international issue. One of the most salient
examples includes a consortium to build a 980-mile-long
pipeline system to transport oil from Tengiz, western
Kazakhstan, to the Black Sea at Novorossiysk, Russia. In
1995, Chevron and Mobil Oil of the United States, British
Gas, Agip of Italy, and Russia’s LUKoil enterprise agreed to
fund the entire pipeline project in return for a 50 percent
share in the pipeline, the governments of Kazakhstan and
Russia agreed to receive the other 50 percent. However,
pipeline construction was delayed despite further inter-
national negotiation over alternative routes and it only
started to bring oil to world markets in 2001 (Mamedov,
2001; pp. 217–259). In general, following the two decades
of numerous discussions over the Caspian, including its
division (in terms of territorial waters, economic zones, and
the ownership of resources) progress has not been
considerable (Malashenko, 2007). In addition, Kazakhstan
has recently started to change its investment policy from
providing favorable incentives to foreign investors to
minimizing these preferential conditions and re-enforcing
national stakes in the Republic’s oil reserves.
In the area of international military cooperation
Kazakhstan has also went through transformations. The
Republic’s military doctrine reﬂects its ofﬁcial policy. In
fact, it underlines relations and partnership with Russia,
China, Central Asian neighbors, the CSTO, SCO, UN, OSCE,
NATO, European Union (EU), and the United States. Initially
Kazakhstan’s actual military policy was largely divided
between Russia and NATO. Following the 9/11 events,
Kazakhstan expressed eagerness to assist the US in theWar
on Terror. In fact, Kazakhstan has had more than 20 engi-
neers from its peace support battalion, KAZBAT, deployed
in Iraq under Polish command with U.S. military airlift and
logistical support from 2003 until 2008, when the troops
were withdrawn (McDermott, 2008). It should be pointed
out that, while the Republic provided support to the US in
the Iraq war, Kazakhstan’s government took a very cautious
position on conﬂict in and around Afghanistan (NATO
Research, 2001). Moreover, regardless of the support to
the US in theWar on Terror, in the second decade following
the collapse of the USSR, Russia has gradually transformed
into the key military partner of Kazakhstan. This can be
explained by many factors, including the resolution of
several key issues relating to the division of previously co-
owned assets, and new threats of insecurity in the region
that demonstrated the Republic’s weaknesses in security12 Kazakhstan’s government was initially reluctant to recognize the
existence of an indigenous terrorist threat and only at a later stage was
the internal terrorist threat admitted. The incidents are related to the
involvement of Kazakhstani citizens in the bombings in Tashkent and
Bukhara in 2004, as well as the detention in Guatanamo Bay of four
Kazakhstani citizens, suspected of militant Islamic activities in southern
Kazakhstan (NATO, 2005).and military resources. Major threats to security in the
region are related to problems such as extremist move-
ments and drug and illegal trafﬁcking12 that have intensi-
ﬁed in the second decade following the collapse of the
USSR. The republic is even considered to be “a major transit
country for illegal trafﬁcking and, in particular, illicit drug-
trafﬁcking originating from Afghanistan”. Other major
concerns relate to illegal arms smuggling, particularly from
Afghanistan, and illegal immigration, mainly from
Afghanistan, China and Uzbekistan (NATO, 2005, p.14).
In the Republic’s military policy changes, the role of the
border was inﬂuential. It should be noted that for
Kazakhstan initially the border issue was linked to Russia
and China; however, after an agreement with Russia on the
delimitation of borders was signed in 2005, the Chinese
aspect of possible territorial disputes became among the
most important possible threats to the national security of
the country. Hence, Russia has recently transferred from
a perception of a possible threat with regards to the terri-
torial integrity of the country to a political guarantor in
Kazakhstan’s relations with other countries – as it had been
during several centuries – and, particularly, in relation to
China. In fact, it was stressed that during in the second
decade, following the collapse of the USSR, that “as
a nuclear power, Russia is a guarantor of national security
for Kazakhstan” (Sultanov, 2010). A protocol on the
demarcation of their common border was signed between
Kazakhstan and China in 2002. This allowed Kazakhstan to
transfer some border troops to other sections of their
border. However, according to Kazakhstani ofﬁcials, 70% of
all Kazakh border troops remain deployed on the Chinese
border (Plater-Zyberk & Conﬂict Studies Research Centre,
2002). In addition, Kazakhstan’s military personnel have
been also trained in the Russian Federation.
Another development in the Republic’s foreign relations
that extends the oil-politik is related to the cultural and
social ties between Kazakhstan and Russia, as even the
border between these countries is the longest international
border in the world (over 4300 miles long) (Kazakhstan’s
Embassy in the Russian Federation, 2008, p.18). Initially,
the huge Russian diaspora was a stumbling block in rela-
tions between the states. In fact, among the key reasons for
dislocation of the former capital Almaty (ex-Alma-Ata) to
Astana (ex-Chelinigrad) was the threat of these territories
secession to Russia (Olcott, 2010, p.100). The majority of the
Russian population lived in the Northern territories,
reaching more than 60% of the population; while the
dislocation of the capital was “accompanied bymigration of
ethnic Kazakhs from the countryside to the urban areas,
where Russian dominance is, thus, was being diluted”
(Trenin, 2002, p.190). However, during the contemporary
period, the considerably decreased share of the Russian
Diaspora in the Republic’s population became an important
factor, contributing to the facilitation of business contacts
and cooperation between the states.
It could be argued that Kazakhstan generally conﬁrms
the trends toward increased confrontation and lack of
cooperation on the institutional level between the post-
cold war partners. However, during the last two decades
there were some cases of successful international cooper-
ation involving Kazakhstan. The negotiation over the
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between Russia, Kazakhstan, USA and the international
community is one of the most vivid cases of this coopera-
tion. At independence in 1991, Kazakhstan “inherited”
thousands of nuclear warheads, intercontinental ballistic
missiles (ICBMs), cruise missiles, and the world’s largest
testing facility in Semipalatinsk (where 456 nuclear tests
took place over a 50-year period) (MID, 2008). In the Soviet
Union, Kazakhstan had been the second republic, after
Russia, with a developed biological weapons program. In its
press releases, Pentagon ofﬁcials stated that “Saddam
Hussein was certainly trying very hard to get just a few
grams of material of this kind, and [in Kazakhstan there
were] 600 kilos” (The Guardian, 1994). From 1991 to 1994,
there were several international discussions held, and
a number of ﬁnal agreements reached between
Kazakhstan, Russia, the US, and IBRD for the eventual
dismantling and elimination of all the nuclear weaponry in
1995. Another example involves space-shuttle launches
from Baikonur that included international commercial
launches from1995.13 These successful examples demon-
strate that cooperation among the world powers in the
region is possible, and this is particularly important in the
area of security or ecology.4. Kyrgyzstan’s uprisings and “geo-military” auctions
Kyrgyzstan, a small country of around ﬁve million
people, is known for its different geopolitical “arsenal”.
Despite the fact that the Republic possesses natural
resources, its poverty rate is extremely high and Kyrgyzstan
is one of the poorest states in the CIS. Due to this, renting of
the Manas airport is an important source of ﬁnancing for
the state, and the Kyrgyz government has been periodically
negotiating the terms of contracts with the USA and Russia,
openly targeting the economic beneﬁts of both. The airport
is used as a military base for operations in Afghanistan. In
October 2008, President Bakiyev threatened to close the
American base, opened there after 9/11 events, after
agreeing to a Russian loan. He reversed the decision when
the US agreed to more than triple its annual rent for the
base (Sterling, 2010). These bargains led to wide-spread
references to Kyrgyzstan as orchestrating a game of “tug-
of-war” between the United States and Russia (Shuster,
2010). Some even accuse Russia of assisting protesters
(Siebens, 2010), however many agree that disorder in the
region is not in the interests of the Russian Federation (Lee,
2010).
While there are problems in the economic area of
development, and disagreements over the strategic part-
ners for cooperation, the population of the country is
confronted with serious social problems and problems,
related to the non-democratic regime and human rights
violations. In particular, in the U.S. State Department’s13 Baikonur, built in Kazakhstan in the 1950s, is the main launch facility
for the current generation of Russian rockets. In fact, 70% of the Russian
space programs are estimated to be launched from Baikonur (Kazakh-
stan’s Aerospace Agency, and RosAviaCosmos as Kazakhstan’s Embassy in
the Russian Federation’s (2001, p.22)).annual survey on Kyrgyzstan, the following human rights
problems were reported: “restrictions on citizens’ right to
change their government; arbitrary killing, torture and
abuse by law enforcement ofﬁcials; pressure on nongov-
ernmental organizations (NGOs) and opposition leaders,
discrimination against women, persons with disabilities,
ethnic and religious minorities, and other persons based on
sexual orientation or gender identity; child abuse; traf-
ﬁcking in persons; and child labor” (U.S. State Department,
2009). Kyrgyzstan is the only Central Asian state in which
two civil uprisings have taken place in the independent era
of development. The ﬁrst, known as the Tulip revolution,
occurred in 2005, and another upraising took place in 2010
(Lee, 2010). The last uprising could be referred as to as the
“peacock revolution”, as the poor population of Kyrgyzstan
was agitated by the ex-president Bakiyev’s excessive
personal wealth and the perceived level of corruption in
the country. Frustration was directed, for example, at the
fact that the ex-president owned a private zoo, including
peacocks (Editorial, 2010). Immediately after the April 2010
uprising took place, some sources stated that it “was more
of a social uprising with very little political perspective
than a revolution” (Lee, 2010), pointing that “while people
are rebelling against the current regime, they have no trust
in the opposition, either” (Lee, 2010). Others pointed out
that this recent coup “may appear to be a comparatively
minor event on the global stage, but in reality it is
a signiﬁcant development in geopolitics and a very risky
tactical ploy by the Obama administration in Washington”
(Aardvark, 2010). In fact, immediately after the events,
Cohen, US expert on Central Asia, expressed apprehension
of the agendas the great powers, as “the United States,
Russia and China all have important interests there, from
the supply of Afghanistan NATO forces to water resources.
Richer and more authoritarian central Asian neighbors are
also anxious about the bloody display of the “people
power” (Cohen, 2010).
Unfortunately, unstable foreign policy inﬂuences
national policy and democracy in the country. Strong
interests in keeping the status quo or opting for change are
reﬂected in either the extent to which political actors
ignore or draw attention to social and human rights prob-
lems in the country. Some Kyrgyz experts stated that
despite the unpopularity of Kyrgyzstani president Akaev in
the early 2000s, few believed in the possibility of the easy
dismantling of his regime (Juraev, 2008, pp.253–264).
There are many publications that have sought to explain
what happened in Kyrgyzstan in 2005, yet there is no
agreement on the nature of this revolution. Polar positions
include references to the support of foreign services, drug-
dealers, clan battles, and results of the falsiﬁed elections.
Kyrgyz experts, in fact, make illustrative comparisons of the
perspectives on this revolution: the 2005 events in
Kyrgyzstanwere described as a ‘wave of democracy [that] is
sweeping the former Soviet Union’.14 However, political
developments since have lowered expectations of demo-
cratic transformation, and already in 2007, it was14 Cohen, A. (2005). Helping Kyrgyzstan’s democratic revolution <http://
www.heritage.org/> quoted in Juraev, S. (2010).
15 Borduzha, N. (2010). MGIMO Diplomatic Module. Speech and conver-
sations with participants of the Module, 14 April, Moscow, MGIMO.
16 Institute of Far Eastern Studies (2010). Gosydarstva Chentralnoi Azii,
Rossiyia I Kitai: poisk novogo formata sotrydnichestva v chelyah realizachii
natchionalnih interesov I obecpecheniyia regionalnoi stabilnosti v ramkah
ShOS’ [The Central Asian states, Russia and China: in search of the new
cooperation frameworks for the purposes of realization of the national
interests and provision of the regional security within the SCO]. Round
table’ discussions, Institute of Far Eastern Studies of Russian Academy of
Sciences, 7 April.
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to be ‘a limited rotation of ruling elites’ (Tudoroiu, 2007). In
2010, the large-scale antigovernment protests were
explained world-wide as a response to “the government’s
brutality and corruption”, unfair social policy, and poor
public management policy” (Drake, 2010).
Regretfully, the future of the country is unsure, and
moreover, some question “who’s next?” as poverty and
similar political regimes are almost the same across the
entire region (Leon, 2010). Kyrgyzstan thus offers another
silent case demonstrating the relevance of the geopolitical
approaches; the states’ development is fundamentally
inﬂuenced by its geopolitical location and the interests of
global powers in it. However, simultaneously, the increased
complexity of the problems Kyrgyzstan and the countries
involved are confronted with demonstrates that in the
contemporary era of globalization purely geopolitical
approaches are counter-productive, and misleading.
5. Regionalism and international cooperation
There is a need for stronger international cooperation in
the region due to the multiple threats of instability,
particularly in relation to ecology, security, etho-religion,
and investments.
In fact, Kazakhstan’s environmental catastrophes such as
Semipalatinsk–Karaganda or Aral Sea could be considered as
global environmental disasters. Another global aspect that
needs to be raised here is related to the cultural and religious
aspects of the region’s developments. In fact, multi-cultural
and multi-ethnic Kazakhstan is a vivid example of these
developments, as more than 120 different nations live there.
While multiculturalism is as part of the national state-
building strategy; the new Republic’s nation-building
includes the issue of the transformation of the identity
formation based on ethno-religious factors. The importance
of issues relating to ethnic relations in the daily life of
population had increased in importance not only in
Kazakhstan (Human Rights Council, 2009), but in the region
in general. It has been argued that ethno-religious factors are
a major factor in violent conﬂict, in Uzbekistan, Kirgizia and
Tajikistan. Improved economic transparency is also an
important factor that requires stronger international coop-
eration. Recent and likely changes in the investment policies
of Kazakhstan and in Turkmenistan, coupled with “geopo-
litical jostling between the major powers, and a tension
between political and business interests means the future
development of the region’s abundant energy resources is
difﬁcult to predict.” (Chatham House, 2010).
These transformations in the investment policies of the
region might change the approach of the leading countries
toward assessing the region’s progress in terms of economic
transparency. It has been pointed out in the literature with
regards to Kazakhstan, for example, that “the overwhelming
majority of the international community seems to be
primarily interested in the overall stability of the country and
its smooth exploitation and shipment of Kazakhstan’s
hydrocarbon resources in order to secure their country’s
energy supply”, emphasizing that the diverse western poli-
cies toward Kazakhstan are subdivided into the state one and
those by such organizations as the Freedom House orTransparency International (Gumppenberg, 2007; Olcott,
2005). There is an obvious need for a strong Central Asian
security system also. A stable neighborhood is of utmost
importance to Europe, for instance, which intends to diver-
sify its energy supply from Central Asian sources, and at the
same time to prevent mass inﬂuxes of migrants, increased
drug-trafﬁcking and penetration by radical and extremist
Islamic groups from Afghanistan. Increased attention should
therefore be placed on the institutional cooperation between
theNATOand the new security organizations in the CIS (such
as the Collective Security Treaty Organization).15
After the collapse of the USSR several integration and
multilateral organizations were established by the former
Soviet republics. Among them the CIS (Commonwealth of
Independent States) was supposed to be the primary
integrating institutional bloc to unite these countries. This
organization has been targeted to assist countries in
maintaining order and facilitating mutual cooperation.
However, to date, it failed to do so. Thus, other organiza-
tions with a more narrow focus were created. In the mili-
tary sphere, the Collective Security Treaty Organization
(CSTO) was established; while in the economic area the
Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC) and the
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) were created.16
In 2002, the Presidents of Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan signed a charter in Tash-
kent founding the Collective Security Treaty Organization
(the CSTO), also known as the Cooperation and Security
Treaty Organization (CSTO). The CSTO grew out of the
framework of the Commonwealth of Independent States,
and ﬁrst began as the CIS Collective Security Treaty (CST),
which was signed on May 15, 1992 in the city of Tashkent.
The Shanghai Cooperation Organization is an intergovern-
mental mutual-security organization, which was founded in
2001 in Shanghai by the leaders of China, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. Its creation
could be tracked to April,1996when the Treaty on Deepening
Military Trust in Border Regions was signed in Shanghai by
the heads of the states of Kazakhstan, the People’s Republic
of China, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan. In April, 1997
these countries signed the Treaty on Reduction of Military
Forces in Border Regions in a meeting in Moscow. The SCO is
primarily centered on its member nations’ Central Asian
security-related concerns, such as terrorism, separatism and
extremism (Lukin & Mochulskiy, 2005). The “Shanghai
Spirit,” and “New Regionalism” are examples of several
notions used in regard to the establishment and activity of
the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. The “Shanghai
spirit” was outlined by Lu Zhongwei, President of the China
Institute of Contemporary International Relations in Beijing
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operation, coexistence, and common interests” (Tao, 2002,
p.23.) In October 2007, the Collective Security Treaty Orga-
nization and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization signed
a Memorandum of Understanding, laying the foundations
for military cooperation between the two organizations
(Nikitina, 2009).
The relations of the CSO and CSTO with the rest of the
world are the most uneven. Although the declaration on
the establishment of the Shanghai Cooperation Organiza-
tion contained a statement that it “is not an alliance
directed against other states and regions and it adheres to
the principle of openness”, it is widely perceived in the
West that one of the original purposes of the SCO was to
serve as a counterbalance to NATO and the United States
(Chossudovsky, 2008a). Moreover, the SCO is even deﬁned
as “a military alliance between Russia and China and
several Central Asian former Soviet republics including
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan”
(Chossudovsky, 2008b) or as the “Warsaw Pact–style mili-
tary and security cooperation” (Cohen, 2009). However, the
CSTO role even in resolving political coups and instability in
the region is limited. During the Moscow State Institute
[University] of International relations (MGIMO) diplomatic
Module the question was posed to the secretary general of
the CSTO N. N. Bordyuzha regarding the possible actions of
the CSTO with regard to military civil coups, such as
Kyrgyzstan, and he responded that the CSTO was estab-
lished against external threats, and that no actions had
been planned in response to the events in Kyrgyzstan.17
However, A. Grozin, head of the Central Asia department
at the Institute of CIS Countries, told corporate-owned
Russian news agency Interfax on 20 April, “intervention
by the CSTO in the event of a civil war in Kyrgyzstan is
inevitable, although undesirable” (BBC Monitoring, 2010).
Such intervention didn’t take place, needless to say. While
it is not in the functions of the CSTO to intervene in such
internal conﬂicts, there obviously should be a regional/
international mechanism to assist the countries of the
region in coping with civil revolutions, especially as such
unrest is related to ethnic confrontations among a state’s
population (as it was in the last case of Kyrgyzstan).
It is impossible to draw a ﬁxed system of regional and
international hegemony in the region in security; as con-
ﬂicting interests in the region prevent having any hierarchy
in the region.18 Due to the increasing role of China in
international affairs, the SCO raises concerns in the West;
the fact that the US applied for observer status in the SCO,
but was rejected in 2005 intensiﬁed these concerns.
However, in case of the CSTO the situation is the opposite.
Openness of the CSTO toward cooperation with the NATO17 Bordyuzha, N. (2010). MGIMO Diplomatic Module. Speech and conver-
sations with participants of the Module, 14 April, Moscow, MGIMO.
Author’s question to the CSTO Head Bordyuzha.
18 Some models refer to broader trends to explain the ties between the
powers involved in the region. According to Deyermond’s (2009) model
of multi-leveled hegemony, for example, the USA is a global hegemon and
the Russian Federation is a regional hegemonsee the scholar’s work with
a vivid title “Matrioshka hegemony? Multi-levelled hegemonic competition
and security in post-Soviet Central Asia”.was rejected despite several attempts by the CSTO and
RussianMinistry of Foreign Affairs to establish mutual links
for the partnership. Disagreements exist also in the
economic area among members of the Eurasian Economic
Community (EurAsEC)/Customs Union and the WTO, “due
to the interests of Kazakhstan and Russia in becoming
members of this global organization” (Pala, 2006).
6. Conclusion
The collapse of the Soviet Union inevitably led to a new
era of international relations. However, 20 years later
reaching a consensus on the nature of the world we live in
seems to be far from achievable. Moreover, new conﬂicts
and controversies that have emerged in Central Asia and in
the entire post-Soviet world require new conceptual and
practical approaches for their effective resolution.19
In fact, although not only widely discussed in literature,
the former Yugoslavia and the Caucasus have appeared to
be the most unstable regions in post-Communist Eurasia.
Central Asia’s advantageous geopolitical position, along
with the geo-economic beneﬁts from oil resources, have
altered existing debates in the ﬁeld of International Rela-
tions due to the myriad of developments related to these
new realities. This is particularly noticeable in Kazakhstan
and Kyrgyzstan, among other countries in this region. In
particular, Kazakhstan’s investment policy on oil reserves is
no longer considered predictable due to the geopolitics of
East andWest, as well as the tensions between political and
business interests, making “the energy game as high as
ever”20. Foreign investment policy is under alteration in the
state, once referred to by Brzezinski as to as a “black hole”
on the “global geopolitical map”, which might lead to the
new wave of international confrontations related to the
enormous foreign capital vested there.
Kyrgyzstan’s “auctions” relating to its military base
Manes for the military operations in Afghanistan is sadly
infamous. In addition, there is a threat that periodic
uprisings in this state could reverberate across Central Asia,
and many are concerned that “it will have a domino effect
in the long term” (Lee, 2010). In the short term, the Central
Asian leaders will tighten the screws, which will lead to
more control and more authoritarianism. Moreover, due to
the high poverty in Kyrgyzstan and some other Central
Asian states, they are exposed to the threat of spreading
terrorism and drug-trafﬁcking from Afghanistan to the
other CIS countries and the world. There is an obvious need
for a strong Central Asian security system, which is
impossible to maintain without international involvement19 It could be pointed here that over the last decade a signiﬁcant body of
literature has redeﬁned “security” (see Bernard, 1998). With the end of
the Cold War, many scholars criticized the traditional, narrow deﬁnition
of security and focused on issues other than military affairs, such as
population growth, environmental degradation, ethnic conﬂict, crime,
drugs, and migration. In fact, in an increasingly globalized world these
issues have been becoming increasingly inter-connected also.
20 Chatham House Conference (2010). The Politics of Central Asian and
Caspian Energy. General Outline, February <http://www.chathamhouse.
org.uk/central_asia_energy> and Chatham House Conference (2010).
The Politics of Central Asian and Caspian Energy, Final Panel Debate, Lon-
don, UK, 24 February.
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the progress on maintaining institutional cooperation
between CSTO and the NATO in the region has not yet been
reached, which intensiﬁes tensions between the countries
of the region, and between the global powers involved.
Problems that are encountered in theCentralAsian region
require urgent attention by the regional and international
organizations and the countries involved; however, reaching
an international consensus is even more complex due to the
range of interests and capitals vested there (Chufrin, 2010).
Despite the importance of the region, international engage-
ment also lacks consistency amongst governments and
business structures of different countries, NGOs, and inter-
national organizations. It should be emphasized that insti-
tutional cooperation is desirable not only in the security
areas, but also in the area of economic cooperation. In the
area of the energy supplies, EBRD stressed that further
support of the energy pipeline developments and infra-
structure requires an improved investment climate and
transparent international legal framework.21 Meanwhile
“instead of a shared vision of cooperative security, there is
a talk of a new Great Game”, which puts at stake successful
economic cooperation (Lo, 2008, p. 97). Contradictions exist
also on the institutional level in the trade area-between the
EurAsEC/Custom’s Union and the WTO, which complicates
foreign relations in the region.
It is considered misleading, then, to refer to one
approach in examining the new web of international rela-
tions in the region as this will not allow the nation-states to
put aside some strategic priorities and to consider others.
Central Asian developments are not limited to the geopo-
litical aspects; currently the countries are encountering
a huge spectrum of socio-political and economic trans-
formations. Consideration of these developments through
purely geopolitical licenses could rather increase confron-
tation instead of offering peaceful constructive solutions
for the national and international actors involved. What
should be prioritized hence is the mutual interest to see the
“defunct communist world region” being more integrated
into the world economy, and world politics as democrati-
cally and economically developed actors contributing to
the mutual beneﬁts of the parties involved.
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